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Introduction: Yet Another Push for Regime Change? 
 
For more than forty-five years, the United States has been unsatisfied with the regime in Cuba.  
Using overt military force, covert action, diplomatic isolation, and economic sanctions, the 
United States government has tried to enact regime change on this Caribbean island.  The most 
recent manifestation stems from the recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a 
Free Cuba.  As the Commission‟s report notes in its Forward, “President Bush formed the U.S. 
Commission ... to explore ways [the US] can help hasten and ease Cuba's democratic transition 
(U.S. Commission, 2004, emphasis added).  In the official mission of the Commission, the first 
objective of the group was to identify ways to bring about regime change in Cuba (Mission and 
Members, 2003).  Thus, the official purpose of the new regulations enacted in 2004 is to destroy 
the current government of Cuba. 
 
Some critics of the United States government‟s decades-long policy toward Cuba argue that 
rather than regime change, US policy fosters regime maintenance.  That is, the hostility of the 
United States government creates a power set of conditions that facilitate the continuation of the 
Castro regime.  Shortcomings in living standards and attainment of revolutionary goals can be 
laid at the feet of the US embargo.  The Cuban leadership is able to equate support for the 
revolution with patriotism.  Furthermore, opposition to the regime – heralded by the US 
government – is cast as “anti-nationalistic.”  Opponents of Castro in Cuba fully understand the 
situation.  Letters were written by opposition figures and delivered to the US Interest Section, 
rejecting the new measures.  Yet in the United States, public policy toward the island seems 
firmly centered on deepening the hardline against the regime. 
 
This paper assesses the impact of the measures on domestic politics in Cuba and the United 
States.  We begin by establishing the status of US-Cuban relations during the 1990s and early 
part of the 200s.  We then turn to the May 6
th
 announcement by President George W. Bush and a 
review of the actual policy changes enacted in May 2004.  The reasons behind the altered 
policies – both stated and implied – are then explored.  Next we examine the impact of these new 
regulations on Cubans and Cuban-Americans.  Drawing upon interviews conducted in Cuba as 
well as survey data from Cuban-Americans, we investigate whether or not the goals of the policy 
have been or are likely to be achieved.  We conclude with a short discussion concerning the most 
recent responses of the Cuban government.  The evidence is clear: both US policy and Cuban 
policy hurt individual Cubans, most of whom are not supportive of the new regulations.  Most 
unusually, even parts of the Cuban-American community expresses discontent with the new 
regulations.  While the current policies seem to be in firmly in place, the desired outcome – 
regime change – appears as remote as previously. 
 
So, where does US foreign policy toward Cuba seem likely to go?  All of the rhetoric suggests a 
continuation of the Bush Administration‟s hardline toward the Castro regime.  In her 
confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rice called Cuba one of the “outposts of tyranny” in the 
world.  As such, the United States was required to not to rest until every person under such a 
regime had finally won their freedom.  The Secretary also articulated an active role for the 
United States government in defeating such tyranny (Rice, 2005).  The Cuban government has 
also hardened its rhetoric, calling the United States a gross violator of human rights and warning 
of US attempts to subvert national sovereignty in Cuba and Venezuela.   
 
Yet there is behavior that contradicts all of this bellicose language.  US governors and other 
elected officials travel to Cuba frequently, seeking to increase the trade between the two 
countries that has grown since the late 1990s.  These elected officials are greeted warmly in 
Cuba and frequently feted around the country.  It is important to remember that the new 
regulations did nothing to stop the sale of agricultural products that has been allowed for several 
years now.  Polls indicate that more Americans support trade with Cuba than support the 
embargo (Chicago Foreign Relations Council, 2004).  In addition, in February 2005, 20 Senators 
(10 Republicans and 10 Democrats) co-sponsored legislation to expand and facilitate the sale of 
US goods to Cuba.  All of this suggests that a change in policy is possible.  However, past 
history implies that  incremental change at the margins is most likely, while both states await the 
inevitable transition in leadership that will occur when Fidel Castro dies. 
 
 
US Policy Toward Cuba: Taking Stock After the Fall of Communism 
 
After the demise of socialism in Eastern Europe and the end of Soviet subsidies, many 
anticipated a quick transition from communism in Cuba as well.  In 1992, then President George 
H. W. Bush stated that “[t]he Castro dictatorship cannot and will not survive” (Bush, 1992).  The 
US government adopted some measures to help speed along the process.   
 
Senator Torricelli sponsored the Cuban Democracy Act.  Passed in 1992 , it aimed to tighten 
economic sanctions against Cuba by forbidding foreign subsidiaries of US companies from doing 
business on the island.  However, the act also “authorized the president to implement a range of 
measures to promote exchanges and contacts between Americans and Cubans” (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1999).  Measures taken under the act included restored direct phone service 
between the two countries,  the opening of news bureaus in Havana, and an easing of travel 
restrictions for scholars, artists, and others. The “balsero crisis” in 1992, when Castro permitted 
Cubans to leave the island in rafts led the United States and Cuba signed immigration accords 
under whose terms 20,000 Cuban citizens are allowed to emigrate to the United States each year, 
including up to 5,000 Cubans per year who qualify as political refugees. The accords also call for 
Cubans attempting to enter the United States irregularly to be returned to Cuba.  
 
In 1994 Senator Helms and Representative Burton sought to further pressure the Cuban regime 
with the Libertad legislation.  Commonly known as Helms-Burton, the law had four key 
sections.  First, the legislation sought to codify the embargo (which up to that time had been in 
effect under an executive order).  Helms-Burton also spelled out those circumstances that had to 
take place in order for the embargo to be removed.  The law also called for compensation for 
nationalization of both Americans and Cubans (now residing in the US) who lost property - with 
interest!  In addition, the legislation called for penalties against non-US companies that did 
business in Cuba, including the denial of US visas for key businessmen.   
 
Yet, the US government also engaged in some constructive engagement with Cuba.  In 1998 
direct charter flights were reinstated between the US and Cuba.  The US government granted 
permission for Cuban-Americans to send remittances to family members on the island.  In 2000, 
the U.S. Congress passed legislation which allowed certain exceptions from U.S. embargo on 
Cuba for agricultural and medical exports.  Since that time, trade from the US to Cuba has 
increased: since December 2001, when agricultural trade began, Cuba has purchased more than 
$700 million.  However, the legislation requires that all transaction are on a cash-and-carry basis, 
which limits the amount of sales. 
 
The 1990s saw a large increase in legal links between the United States and Cuba.  US students 
traveled to the island to participate in exchange programs.  Travelers went to Cuba as part of 
educational trips sponsored by organizations like Global Exchange.  Cuban-Americans flew to 
the island to visit family members and friends.  Businessmen journeyed to Havana and the 
provinces to make contacts and sign trade deals. 
 
The reversal of these policies began incrementally.  First, in March 2003, the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control (OFAC) issued new regulations that limited educational travel to Cuba to degree-
granting institutions only.  This effectively ended the “people-to-people” educational trips that 
had been taking place for several years.  These new restrictions proved to be a precursor to the 
regulations announced in May 2004. 
 
 
The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba and Its Recommendations 
 
In October 2003, President Bush established to Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.  
Secretary of State Colin Powell was named its chair.  Members consisted of representatives 
from:  
The Departments of State, the Treasury, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, 
Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Energy, 
Education, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security, the United States Agency for International 
Development, National Security Council, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of 
Management and Budget, United States Trade Representative, and the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy.  Its mandate focused on five different areas: bringing about a peaceful, near-term 
end to the dictatorship; establishing democratic institutions, respect for human rights, and the 
rule of law; creating the core institutions of a free economy; modernizing infrastructure; and 
meeting basic needs in the areas of health, education, housing, and human services (Mission and 
Members of the Commission).  When announcing the Commission, President Bush stated that  
 
Clearly, the Castro regime will not change by its own choice. 
But Cuba must change. So today I'm announcing several new 
initiatives intended to hasten the arrival of a new, free, 
democratic Cuba. (Bush, October 10, 2003) 
 
When the Commission delivered its report, the President accepted its recommendations fully.  In 
keeping with its mission, there were several difference aspects to the Commission‟s plan of 
action. 
 
In order to hasten the fall of the Castro regime, the Commission called for several different new 
regulations.  A number of them dealt with the Cuban-American community.  Those wishes to 
travel to Cuba for family visits have to apply for specific licenses.  They may only visit Cuba 
once every three years.  New arrivals from Cuba must wait three year to visit.  Authorized per 
diem has been decreased from $164 to $50 per day.  Family visits are only permitted to see 
immediate family, which is stipulated as “grandparents, grandchildren, parents, siblings, spouses, 
and children” (Commission Recommendations).  Regulations concerning remittances have also 
be revised.  In keeping with the travel restrictions, remittances are allowed only for permitted 
family members, none of whom can be Cuban Communist Party members or Cuban government 
officials.  Cuban-Americans are still permitted to send $300 per quarter to those who are 
qualified to receive the money.  With regard to gift parcels, rules were amended to limit: (1) 
eligible recipients to immediate family members (as identified by the Commission); (2) the 
frequency of non-food gift parcels to once per month per household; and, (3) the types of non-
food items that may be included in gift parcels. Gift parcels to Cuban Communist Party members 
and Cuban government officials are prohibited.  The Commission also recommended greater 
emphasis on law enforcement and “sting operations against „mule‟ networks and others who 
illegally carry money” (Commission Recommendations). 
 
Those beyond the Cuban-American community were also targeted.  From the perspective of the 
US government, action needed to be taken “to deny resources and legitimacy to the Castro 
regime” and to “eliminate abuses of educational travel programs through tighter regulations” 
(Commission Recommendations).  The educational activities permitted under academic licenses 
was amended to authorize only full semester programs of study in Cuba by degree-granting 
institutions for certain students (it must be within their major).  In practice, the educational 
licenses of most universities and colleges in the United States are not being renewed, thereby 
making even semester-long exchanges impossible (LASA 2004, Cuba Section Meeting).   
 
The Commission also recommended actions aimed at people within Cuba.  The President is 
authorizing “up to $36 million to carry out democracy-building activities, support for the family 
members of the political opposition, and to support efforts to help youth, women, and Afro-
Cubans take their rightful place in the pro-democracy movement.”  Furthermore, the 
Commission proposed “up to $18 million for regular airborne broadcasts to Cuba and the 
purchase of a dedicated airborne platform for the transmission of Radio and Television Mart into 
Cuba.”   And, the Commission also suggested that the US government spend  “$5 million for 
public diplomacy efforts to disseminate information abroad about U.S. foreign policy, including 
Castro's record of abusing human rights, harboring terrorists, committing espionage against other 
countries, fomenting subversion of democratically-elected governments in Latin America, and 
other actions which pose a threat to United States national interests.” (Recommendations of the 
Commission) 
 
Some components of the new regulations focused exclusively on the Cuban government.  For 
instance, the Commission called for the US government to “neutralize Cuban government front 
companies by establishing a Cuban Asset Targeting Group made up of law enforcement 
authorities to investigate and identify new ways hard currency moves in and out of Cuba.” The 
Commission‟s recommendations include targeting “regime officials for visa denial if they (1) are 
or were involved in torture or other serious human rights abuses or (2) provided assistance to 
fugitives from U.S. justice” (Recommendations of the Commission).  In practice, the US 
government has been broadly refusing visa requests for any Cubans that work for the state, 
including academics who had traditionally traveled to the US for scholarly purposes (LASA 
2004, Cuba Section Meeting). 
 
All of the above measures are seen as mechanisms for quickening the demise of the Castro 
regime.  With an eye towards what it considers to be an “inevitable” regime change, the 
Commission requested the creation of the Transition Coordinator in the State Department.  The 
job of the Coordinator is to “facilitate expanded implementation of pro-democracy, civil-society 
building, and public diplomacy projects and to continue regular planning for future transition 
assistance contingencies” (Commission Recommendations).  It is important to note that the 
Commission‟s recommendations include plans to assist the transition to “democracy and a free 
market economy”(Commission Recommendations).  Most of the plans, though, are vague 
commitments to “create the core institutions of a free economy,” “modernize infrastructure,” 
“build a strong democracy based upon democratic institutions, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights,” and “recover and safeguard its environmental assets” – among other objectives 
(Commission Recommendations). 
 
 
Why Change Policy Toward Cuba? 
 
Most of the ambitious foreign policy plans of the current US administration focus on the Middle 
East.  Why, then, did the Bush administration initiate this significant reformation of US policy 
toward Cuba?  What assumptions are behind the policy?  What objectives are desired? 
 
Taking the administration at its own words, clearly one goal was to effect regime change.  The 
government assumed that average Cubans desire change and welcome efforts on the part of the 
US to weaken the current Cuban government.  When asked about the anticipated reaction of 
Cubans to the new regulations, the State Department official charged with day-to-day oversight 
of the Commission, Asst. Secretary of State Noriega, was quite firm in his vision. 
 
On the perceptions on the island, I think that they will -- 
that people on the island, to the extent that the word can 
get out on this through a more robust Radio and TV 
Marti, and all that, and the word of mouth will be that, 
"The United States is thinking about the future, our 
friends in the United States are thinking about the 
future, our friends in the United States are working with 
others in the world to help us. We need to do that. We 
need to step forward. We need to prepare ourselves. We 
need to associate with other Cubans who want a free 
Cuba." And I think that will be the message of solidarity 
that will reach the island, and that will be very 
important. (Press conference, May 6, 2004 - Asst. Sec of 
State Roger Noriega, emphasis added) 
 
The government consistently argues that the measures target the Cuban Communist Party and 
members of the Castro regime.  These are unjust, illegal, despotic tyrants who do not enjoy the 
trust or favor of the Cuban population.  The measures are not seen as hurting average Cubans, 
rather, they are presented as 
 
... a strategy that encourages the spending of money to 
help organizations to protect dissidents and to promote 
human rights. It is a strategy that encourages a clear voice 
of the truth being spoken to the Cuban people through 
radio and TV Marti. It is a strategy that will prevent the 
regime from exploiting hard currency of tourists and of 
remittances to Cubans to prop up their repressive regime. 
It is a strategy that says we're not waiting for the day of 
Cuban freedom, we are working for the day of freedom in 
Cuba (Bush, May 6, 2004) 
 
No surprisingly, others offered more cynical interpretations of the goals of the new regulations.  
Most of these assessments focused on the 2004 presidential election.  Given the pivotal role 
played by the state of Florida in the 2000 presidential election as well as the existence of a 
crucial group of single-issue voters in the state–Cuban-Americans–certain domestic US political 
objectives were assumed.  As leading scholars on Cuba and US-Cuban relations noted, domestic 
politics frequently plays a role in determining US policy toward the island.   
 
Changes in our policy towards Cuba have historically 
corresponded with U.S. elections. ... it is nothing more 
than a “symbolic policy,” a political tool used to ensure 
the Republican vote from Cuban-Americans residing in 
the all important swing state. These latest measures are in 
response to weakening support for President Bush among 
Cuban-Americans. According to a recent poll, while 64 
percent of the Cuban-Americans in Miami voted for Bush 
in 2000 only 56 percent intend to in 2004. This represents 
a potential loss of 30,000 votes in a state that was 
supposedly won by Bush with a margin of 500 votes. 
(Smith and Patel, 2004) 
 
This cynical view of the measures adopted was further strengthened by what the new regulations 
did not prohibit.  As one major think tank on Latin America stated: 
it is notable that the new policy does not limit the per 
diems of business people going on agricultural sales-
related trips, or take other measures that would limit U.S. 
agricultural sales to Cuba; the Administration doesn‟t 
want to jeopardize the President‟s standing with the 
agricultural export community or in farm states (Farley 
and Thale, 2004) 
Thus, researchers are left with two diametrically opposed interpretations.  Did the policy seek 
change in Cuba or reelection in the United States?  To assess the efficacy of the new regulations, 
we must examine the impact of the regulations both in Cuba and among Cuban-Americans.  Did 
(or will) the recommendations of the Commission achieve either its stated or assumed goals? 
 
Assessing the Impact of the New Regulations 
We will now turn to how Cubans and Cuban-Americans have reacted to the changes enacted in 
May 2004.  Are Cubans viewing it in line with Asst. Secretary Noriega‟s prediction?  Did more 
Cuban-Americans vote for President Bush as a result of the measures?  To determine these 
answers we sought information from Cubans in Cuba and Cuban-Americans, primarily in 
Florida.  Interviews with Cubans and press conferences, published interviews, and other 
scholarly reports were used to assess how Cubans responded to the new regulations.  We drew 
predominantly on surveys and opinion polls for the collecting of information about Cuban-
American views on the new rules. 
 
We traveled to Cuba almost two months after the new regulations had been announced.  Both of 
us had traveled to Cuba previously and had numerous contacts within the country.  A formal 
survey of opinion was not possible.  However, a wide variety of people were questioned over the 
course of a month about their impressions of the new regulations.  Some of those questioned 
were previous acquaintances, others were strangers.  Some openly expressed criticism of the 
current government in Cuba, so this was not a survey exclusively of those who were either afraid 
of the regime or unwaveringly supportive.  Both males and females were asked their opinions.  
People who worked in the tourism sector as well as those unconnected to travelers were queried.  
All of the interviews took place in Havana, but a number of the respondents were not natives of 
the city and could address the question of how provincial Cubans might respond.  All of the 
Cubans we talked to were aware of the new rules and all had opinions about them. 
 
Reactions of Cubans in Cuba 
It must be stated at the beginning that the Cubans we spoke to were overwhelming negative 
about the new regulations.  News reports from various sources confirm that this is the most 
commonly expressed reaction to the new rules (see, for instance, Frank and Lapper 2004).  Some 
were dismissive of its impact.  “Family will always find a way to visit” was a commonly 
expressed opinion.    Others, though, felt that the new regulations would decrease the number of 
Cuban-Americans visiting the island.  In the opinion of these people, the economy of the island 
would suffer somewhat.  However, several were quick to point out that Cuban-Americans were 
not the main source of tourism.  
 
Almost every Cuban we spoke to was critical of the US definition of qualified family members.  
“The US is not like Latin America – our family ties are not limited to the immediate family.”  
The idea that aunts and uncles were not family was roundly rejected.  Limiting family visits to 
once every three years was also seen as intrusive and cruel.  It is ironic that an Administration 
perceived to be representative of family values in the United States was commonly viewed as 
anti-family in Cuba. 
 
Cubans did not seem to think that this was a clarion call to rise up against the regime.  Those that 
were critical of the regime saw the new regulations as counter-productive. In an interview 
published in Salon.com, Miriam Leiva, vice president of an independent journalists‟ society in 
Cuba and wife of prominent (and jailed) dissident Oscar Espinosa Chepe, opposed the new 
regulations. 
   
Did the Bush administration ask for the opinion of 
internal dissidents when the Commission for Assistance 
to a Free Cuba crafted its report?  No.  Will the measures 
hurt the Castro regime?  No.  Instead, the Cuban people 
will suffer from the effects of the measures and more 
political dissidents could be sent to prison (“Whose 
country is it, anyway?” May 24, 2004) 
 
Other dissidents were equally dismissive.  In response to the Commission, Oswaldo Paya, a 
leading dissident in Cuba, said it was up to Cubans, not the US, to bring about change in the 
country.   At the US Interest Section, two other Cuban dissidents, Manuel Cuesta and Eloy 
Gutierrez Menoyo, presented a letter of protest over the Commission‟s recommendations.  
Cuesta said that the US had “no right to set the pace of a transition in Cuba”.  Gutierrez Menoyo 
stated that “This is a total interference that does not benefit the building of democracy in Cuba ... 
the US plan (is) tantamount to incitement to armed conflict” Another important Cuban opponent 
to the Castro regime, Elizardo Sanchez,  described the proposals as "totally counterproductive 
and clearly involve meddling" from abroad (quoted in “Cuban Dissidents Attack Bush Plan,” 
May 10, 2004). Thus, our own research, reporting of others, and leading dissidents in Cuba all 
suggest that Asst. Secretary of State Noriega was not correct in predicting that Cubans would 
embrace the regulations as an opportunity to end the Castro regime.  Were calculations about 
Cuban-American approval of the new measures equally off? 
 
The Response of Cuban-Americans 
 
 
Old Policy, New Times?  Implications for Changing US Policy Toward Cuba 
 
The situation in Cuba is intriguing.  Castro is aging; his recent fall symbolized his looming 
mortality.  A change in leadership (if not regime) is inevitable.  However, the policy of the US 
toward Cuba does not necessarily hurt Castro.  Increasingly, problems within Cuba and the need 
for stringent vigilance against dissidents can be justified by US hostility.  US actions in Iraq 
further strengthen Castro‟s charges that an invasion by the US is possible.  This enables the 
government to equate regime support with Cuban patriotism; by contrast, opposing the regime 
suggests anti-patriotic attitudes.  In some ways, one can suggest that Castro is assisted, not 
weakened, by US policy.   
 
The growth of ties between Cuba and other countries also undercuts the impact of US 
regulations.  The European Union has improved economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba since 
the release of dissidents last spring.  Cuba has also reached out the other Caribbean countries.  
Most interestingly, China and Cuba have enacted a number of economic, political, diplomatic, 
and military exchanges.  Globalization has facilitated these ties; US policy has not yet adapted to 
the new circumstances of the global arena.  Cuba is still 90 miles from the US; the distance 
between Cuba and other countries, though, has diminished. 
 
The situation in the US is also unusually.  The executive branch has clearly signaled a harder 
approach to Cuba; this is in keeping with its overall foreign policy.  Yet, the Congress of the 
United States is sending opposing signs.  In 2004, both houses of Congress voted to lift the travel 
ban.  This provision, however, was removed from the bill in conference at the request of the 
White House.  Congressional disapproval is growing.  For example,  
 
U.S. Sens. Max Baucus, D-Mont., Pat Roberts, R-Kan., 
Byron Dorgan, D-N.D., and Arlen Specter, R-Pa., who 
had previously supported a strengthening of sanctions 
against Havana, have become leading advocates in 
Congress for the removal of trade and travel restrictions 
on Cuba. Baucus and Roberts, who had voted for Helms-
Burton, now argue that the Cuban embargo is a 
"hopelessly ineffective tool" and that agricultural exports 
to the island "help U.S. farmers, feed hungry people and 
spread the seeds of democracy." (Paolo Spadoni, 
Orlando Sentinel, March 15, 2005) 
 
Moves in Congress to official lift the travel ban and end the embargo are gaining ground.  Work 
to overturn the new regulations are also taking place. 
 
Research indicates that the Cuban-American community is also changing.  Breaking survey data 
into different cohorts based on year of arrival in the US shows a marked difference between early 
and later arrivals in terms of their support for the embargo and ties to Cuba.  The growth of a 
“moderate” Cuban community, with the goal of better relations to Cuba, testifies to this 
transition.  Could the leading popular force behind “hardline” relations be diminishing? 
 
While the new regulations suggest a return to a Cold War relationship between Cuba and the US, 
other factors push the two in a different direction.  The changing Cuban-American community, 
increased US business interests in Cuba, the growth of foreign business interests in Cuba – all of 
these elements conspire to bridge the gap between Cuba and the US.  What the next years will 
bring lies more within the sphere of US domestic politics, though.  How much political capital do 
the different actors want to expend on opposing or maintaining current policy?  What kind of 
“electoral connection” exists?  Clearly, the evidence indicates a growing possibility for a new era 
in US-Cuba relations.  However, the willingness of the Bush Administration to pursue its own 
vision in foreign policy is well established.  The struggle over US-Cuban relations lies in the 
political calculus of the relative strength of ideologues and pragmatists. So far, ideologues have 
been winning. 
